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NOTE
Marc Rich: An Expansion Of United
States Criminal Jurisdiction Over
Foreign Defendants
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1983 the United States government sought the production of doc-
uments relating to the oil trading activities of Marc Rich & Co., A.G.
("Marc Rich & Co."), in order to obtain an indictment of Marc Rich &
Co.'s principal directors and officers for criminal violation of United
States tax law.1 Through the application of an expansive "minimum con-
tacts" analysis, a United States district court and court of appeals as-
serted their jurisdiction over Marc Rich & Co., a Swiss corporation, even
though Marc Rich & Co. did not regularly engage in business in the
United States.2 Both courts then ordered Marc Rich & Co. to produce
1 After a long series of court battles, Marc Rich & Co. and its wholly owned U.S. subsidiary,
Marc Rich & Co., International, Ltd. ("International") pled guilty in October 1984 to violating U.S.
tax and energy laws. On October 11, 1984, the two corporations paid $150,000,000 to the U.S.
government and agreed to withdraw any claims to the $21,000,000 they had already paid to the U.S.
government in fines for disobeying a court order to turn over certain documents of Marc Rich & Co.
which were located in Switzerland. Moreover, Marc Rich & Co. agreed to forego attempting to
utilize $40,000,000 in tax deductions to which International would have been entitled.
The tax evasion charges are still pending against Mr. Marc Rich, the chairmen of the board at
both Marc Rich & Co. and International, and Mr. Pincus Green, the second in command of Internia-
tional and board member of Marc Rich & Co. The U.S. government attempted to extradite Mr.
Marc Rich and Mr. Pincus Green, but the Swiss government would not cooperate because the Swiss
determined that the tax and energy offenses with which Rich & Green were charged involved a
revenue matter which was not within the four corners of the United States and Switzerland extradi-
tion treaty. The U.S. and Swiss extradition treaty, signed in May 1900, covers cases of murder,
arson, robbery, embezzlement, forgery, abduction and rape, piracy, destruction of railroad property,
and perjury. Wall Street Journal, September 23, 1983 § 1 at 18. Thus, both Mr. Marc Rich and Mr.
Pincus Green are "fugitives of justice" according to the United States Attorney's Office. Telephone
conversation with Morris Weinberg Jr., Assistant United States Attorney (February 12, 1985).
2 In the Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena Directed to Marc Rich & Co., A.G., No. M-11-188,
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certain of its documents located in Switzerland.3 Based upon these docu-
ments, a federal grand jury indicted Marc Rich & Co. and Marc Rich &
Co.'s wholly owned United States subsidiary, Marc Rich & Co., Interna-
tional Ltd. ("International") for allegedly concealing more than $100
million in taxable income in 1980 and 1981, resulting in one of the largest
tax evasion schemes in United States history.4
According to the indictment, International diverted income through
"sham transactions" by buying oil at artificially high prices from Marc
Rich & Co. Marc Rich & Co. does not file United States income-tax
returns. The indictment charged that International purchased domestic
crude oil under federal price controls and then passed that oil through a
"daisy chain" of other oil traders, with Marc Rich & Co. eventually re-
purchasing the barrels and reselling them at illegally high prices. To
avoid paying taxes on the profits from these activities, Marc Rich & Co.
set up another series of transactions in which other traders would bill
Marc Rich & Co. at much higher prices for oil than Marc Rich & Co.
actually paid. These profits were then siphoned off to Marc Rich & Co.'s
overseas operations.5
The district court's decision in Marc Rich is important because it
may set forth a new federal standard of jurisdiction in criminal cases.6
The primary theory of jurisdiction has been the "presence/doing business
test"7 in criminal cases, and the "transaction of business" test in civil
slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1982); In Re Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1983).
Because the district court decision is unpublished, the decision may have less of an impact on other
court decisions than it otherwise would have.
3 Id. These documents related to oil trading activities of the company in 1980 and 1981.
Though Swiss law forbids the disclosure of business secrets, Marc Rich & Co. submitted the affidavit
of a professor of law at the University of Zurich, which stated that in complying with the court order
Marc Rich & Co. would probably violate Swiss law. Article 273 of the Penal Code of Switzerland
provides that a person who discloses a business secret to a foreign government shall be punished with
imprisonment and a fine. In August 1985, the Swiss government announced that it was ending its
investigation of AG's violation of the Swiss Espionage Law. Telephone conversation with Martin
Auerbach, Assistant United States Attorney (September 30, 1985).
4 Tully & Worth, "Secrets of Marc Rich," FORTUNE January 23, 1984, p. 44.
5 Wall Street Journal, September 20, 1983 § 2 at 3. See Tully & Worth, supra note 4, at 44-49.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 61-67.
7 Under this theory, a court only has jurisdiction over defendants who maintain continuous and
systematic activities within the jurisdiction. See, e.g., In Re Canadian Int'l Paper Co., 72 F. Supp.
1013, 1019-1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (charge of Sherman Act violation; court has jurisdiction. The
court specifically stated that the fact that the Canadian company paid for an office in New York and
paid salaries to the employees who maintained the offices and that the company had a substantial
bank account in New York constituted continuous and substantial activities in New York.); Interna-
tional Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 585 (1914) (charge of violating state antitrust law;
court has jurisdiction. The court found that the presence of a company agent in the state who
solicited orders from customers of that state constituted a continuous course of business).
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cases.8  Before Marc Rich, to the best of this author's knowledge, no
court had ever applied the more flexible transaction of business test as a
basis of jurisdiction in a criminal case.9 By asserting jurisdiction on this
basis, the district court may have substantially improved the govern-
ment's ability to prosecute foreign'" defendants for alleged violations of
United States law. 1'
Though the court of appeals found a technical error in the district
court's assertion of jurisdiction, it implicitly validated the application of
the transaction of business test in criminal cases.12 The court of appeals
expressly asserted its jurisdiction over Marc Rich & Co. on the basis of
three sets of facts without relating these facts to any particular jurisdic-
tional theory. 3
First, the court of appeals observed that both the conspiracy to
evade the income tax laws and at least some of the conspiratorial acts
occurred within the United States.' Second, the court of appeals stated
that Marc Rich & Co.'s alleged violation of United States tax laws oc-
curred with the cooperation of International, which is authorized to do
business in New York.'5 Third, the court of appeals stated that two of
the five board members of Marc Rich & Co. and International reside in
the United States.'6
By failing to explain which legal theories of jurisdiction it was ap-
plying, the court of appeals added to the confusion regarding criminal
jurisdiction over foreign defendants. 7
Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has enunciated a uniform
8 Under the transaction of business theory, the court has jurisdiction over the defendant if the
defendant's contact with the jurisdiction forms the basis of the lawsuit. See, eg., N.Y. Civ. Prac.
Law § 302(a)(1); "[Tihe statute reveals a legislative intent to confer jurisdiction where the subject
matter of the litigation is related to the contacts with the jurisdiction." Marc Rich, No. M-1 1-188 at
16.
9 State v. Luv Pharmacy, Inc., 118 N.H. 398, 403, 388 A.2d 190, 193-94 (1979). "[W]e are
unable to locate and the parties have failed to cite, any case law applying this [minimum contacts]
test to criminal proceedings" (charge of violating obscenity laws; court has jurisdiction).
10 The term "foreign" as used in this Note, means a person or corporation whose residence or
principal place of bixsiness is outside of the United States.
11 Because the transaction of business test is a broader theory of jurisdiction than the presence/
doing business test, it will be easier for a court to find that it has jurisdiction when using the former
test rather than the latter test.





17 Although the Supreme Court enunciated a uniform federal standard of jurisdiction for civil
cases in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), there is no uniform federal
standard ofjurisdiction for criminal cases. See infra note 18.
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federal standard of jurisdiction for use in criminal cases. 8 Lower federal
courts have been left to promulgate standards of jurisdiction on their
own which comport with the due process requirements of the United
States Constitution. Currently, the federal courts apply two theories of
criminal jurisdiction. The courts sometimes apply the "corporate pres-
ence/doing business" theory of jurisdiction. 19 Under this theory, a court
has jurisdiction over only those foreign defendants which can be said to
be regularly "doing business" in the United States.2' Courts have defined
doing business to mean that a defendant maintains an office, employees,
bank accounts, or other formal indicia of conducting business within the
United States.2 '
The second theory of criminal jurisdiction is the "detrimental conse-
quences" test.2 2 Under this theory, a United States court has jurisdiction
over a foreign defendant if the defendant's actions are intended to and do
have a detrimental effect in the United States, even if the defendant does
not regularly or ever transact any business within the United States.23
The "transaction of business" test constitutes a third theory of juris-
diction used by courts.24 In the past, courts applied this test in civil
cases. Under this test, if a defendant's particular United States business
transaction forms the basis of a lawsuit, then the court has jurisdiction
18 The Supreme Court has not yet decided what the federal standard of criminal jurisdiction
should be, nor whether it should be based upon minimum contacts as in civil cases. Comment,
Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations: The Application of a Minimum Contacts Theory, 17
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 429, 431 (1980).
19 See supra note 7.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 See infra note 23.
23 Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911) (indictment for bribery in Michigan; charge of being
fugitive from justice; Michigan court has jurisdiction because "Acts [referring to the bribery and
false representations made by the defendant] done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce
and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm as if he
had been present at the effect." Id. at 285); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468
F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972) (charge of violation of federal security laws; court has jurisdiction over
some of the defendants, since "The person sought to be charged must know or have good reason to
know that his conduct will have effects in the state seeking to assert jurisdiction over him." Id. at
1341). To be a "knowing" violation of the law, the defendant's violation must either be a direct and
foreseeable result of the defendant's actions, or the conduct and its effect must be generally recog-
nized as constituent elements of a crime or tort under the laws of states that have reasonably devel-
oped legal systems, according to the American Law Institute. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 18 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); reprinted in Len-
hoff, International Law and Rules on International Jurisdiction, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 5, 15. The court
in Leasco applied the Restatement's detrimental effects test described above. Leasco, 468 F.2d at
1333-34. In both Leasco and Strassheim, the courts impliedly ruled that the violation of a state's
laws constitutes a "detrimental effect" within the state.
24 See supra note 8.
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over the defendant on the basis of that particular transaction alone. 25
The transacting business test, like the detrimental consequences test,
is a form of "specific," as opposed to "general," jurisdiction.26 Under
specific jurisdiction, the assertion of adjudicatory authority is limited to
controversies grounded in particular situations, while under general ju-
risdiction, adjudicatory authority extends in principle to any claim
against the defendant.27
Under both the transacting business and detrimental consequences
tests, however, it can be easier to assert jurisdiction over foreign defend-
ants than under the formalistic presence/doing business analysis.28 The
United States Supreme Court has replaced the presence/doing business
test with the "minimum contacts" test for civil cases.2 9 The Court has
ruled that courts have jurisdiction over foreign defendants in civil mat-
ters so long as the defendants have maintained a sufficient minimum of
contacts with the state so that the exercise of jurisdiction is "reasonable"
and "just".30
This Note will first examine how jurisdiction was asserted over
Marc Rich & Co. through the district court's application of two theories
of jurisdiction31 (the presence/doing business test and the transacting
25 Marc Rich, No. M-11-188, slip op. at 16; see supra note 8.
26 If a company regularly does business in the United States, then any dispute which a person
has with the company, even if unrelated to the company's business in the United States, can be
adjudicated in a United States court, because the court has "general jurisdiction" over the company.
On the other hand, if a company transacted only a single business transaction in the United States, a
United States court would only have jurisdiction over the company for claims arising out of that
particular transaction. Von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and
Evaluated, 63 B.U.L. REv. 280, 286 (1983).
27 Id.
28 Under the presence/doing business test, the foreign defendant must maintain systematic and
continuous contacts within the United States, see supra note 7, whereas under the transacting busi-
ness test, a single transaction within the United States could support jurisdiction. See supra note 8.
Under the detrimental consequences test, a court could have jurisdiction over a defendant who has
personally had no "contact" with the United States other than the act of violating United States'
laws, so long as that violation was a "knowing" one. See supra note 23.
29 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The defendant company in Inter-
national Shoe employed salesmen in the state of Washington to exhibit samples and solicit orders
from prospective buyers to be accepted or rejected by the company whose principle place of business
was in another state. The Court ruled that not only would systematic and continuous activities
confer jurisdiction, as in the case before it, but that even a single or occasional act in the state could
confer state jurisdiction due to the nature, quality, and circumstances of the act's commission. Id. at
318.
30 Id. at 320. The court stated that "minimum contacts" are those contacts with a state which
are necessary for the assertion of jurisdiction to comply with due process requirements. Id. at 316.
In determining whether the "contacts" are sufficient, the Court ruled that one factor to consider is
the inconvenience to the defendant in responding to the suit in the jurisdiction. Id. at 317.
31 See infra § IIA of this Note.
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business test) and the court of appeals' application of three theories of
jurisdiction32 (the detrimental consequences test, the presence/doing
business test, and the transacting business test).33 This Note will argue
that Marc Rich underscores the inadequacy of the presence/doing busi-
ness test in protecting a state's interest in prosecuting alleged violations
of its laws.34 According to the district court, jurisdiction over Marc Rich
& Co. would not have existed under the presence/doing business test
because Marc Rich & Co. did not maintain the formal indicia of doing
business in the United States.35 Nevertheless, under the transacting busi-
ness test, the district court managed to find jurisdiction even though
Marc Rich & Co. did not regularly conduct business in the United
States.36 Marc Rich & Co. had transacted business in the United States
through and with its wholly-owned United States subsidiary, Interna-
tional. These transactions allegedly had violated United States tax laws.
Therefore, the district court ruled that "if the subject matter of the inves-
tigation is related to the contacts with the jurisdiction, the grand jury's
exercise of its subpoena power should not be invalidated by the Court."37
Though the court of appeals found a technical error with the district
court's application of the transacting business test,38 the court of appeals
indirectly validated this test as well as the presence/doing business test
and the detrimental consequences test in a perplexing opinion which
combined all three theories to assert jurisdiction over Marc Rich & Co.39
Thus, even the court of appeals was unable to assert jurisdiction over
Marc Rich & Co. solely on the basis of the presence/doing business test.
Second, this Note will argue that the district court's and court of
appeals' application of any of the three theories of jurisdiction (e.g., the
presence/doing business, detrimental consequences, or transacting busi-
ness theories of jurisdiction) would conform with precedent because the
Supreme Court and lower federal courts have applied both the presence/
doing business test and the detrimental consequences test as bases of
32 See infra § IIB of this Note.
33 Marc Rich, No. M-11-188, slip op.; In Re Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.
1983).
34 Neither the district court nor the court of appeals was able to assert jurisdiction over Marc
Rich & Co. based upon the presence/doing business theory ofjurisdiction. See Marc Rich, No. M-
11-188 slip op.; In Re Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1983).
35 Marc Rich, No. M-11-188, slip op. at 14. Marc Rich & Co. asserted that it did no business in
the United States nor was it authorized to do so. Id. at 4.
36 Id. at 16.
37 Id.
38 In Re Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d at 667. "We agree with counsel for both sides that
Judge Sand should not have looked to New York State's long-arm statute in answering this ques-
tion." Id.
39 Id. See infra text accompanying notes 87-90.
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criminal jurisdiction.' A court could also apply the transacting business
test, without conflicting with precedent, so long as it satisfied the due
process clause, because there is no uniform federal standard of criminal
jurisdiction.41
Third, this Note will identify four interests of the United States
which a future federal standard of criminal jurisdiction can impact.4 2
The relative abilities of each of the three tests to meet these interests will
then be discussed.43 This Note will then argue that a uniform federal
standard of criminal jurisdiction should be promulgated and that this
standard should be based upon the detrimental consequences test.44 Ap-
plication of the detrimental consequences test will serve to balance the
United States' interest in prosecuting violations of its laws, maintaining
its position as an international center for trade, securing due process of
law for potential defendants, and setting an international precedent
which will protect United States citizens and corporations from surprise
suits in other countries.45
Fourth, this Note will discuss the importance of the allocation of the
burden of proof of the court's jurisdiction and will review the district
court's and court of appeals' allocation of the burden of proof.46 This
Note will argue that the district court was correct in requiring the gov-
ernment to make aprimafacie showing of jursidiction and that the court
of appeals erred in requiring the government to establish a reasonable
probability of ultimate success on the issue.47 The reasonable probability
burden of proof is more difficult to satisfy than the prima facie burden48
and should only be applied when the defendant is challenging the grant
of a preliminary injunction.49 Because there is no support for the propo-
sition that ordering compliance with a grand jury subpoena is tanta-
mount to a preliminary injunction," this Note will argue that the court
of appeals should not have applied this test.5 '
Fifth, this Note will examine the district court's decision to compel
the production of documents despite the prohibition of Swiss secrecy
40 See supra notes 7 and 23.
41 See supra note 17.
42 See infra § III B of this Note.
43 Id
44 See infra § III C of this Note.
45 See infra § III B of this Note.







International Law & Business 6:615(1984)
statutes.5 2 The Note will argue that case law clearly supports the district
court's decision."
II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S AND COURT OF APPEALS' ASSERTION
OF JURISDICTION OVER MARC RICH & CO.
A. The District Court's Assertion of Jurisdiction
Over Marc Rich & Co.
The district court, in determining whether it had jurisdiction over
Marc Rich & Co., first applied the presence/doing business test.5 4 The
court noted that a corporation is deemed to be present in a state if it does
business there, not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of
permanence and continuity. 5 A corporation also may be deemed present
in a state due to the activities of its subsidiary, if the subsidiary is in
reality merely a department or puppet of the parent or if the subsidiary
has acted as the agent of the parent. 6 The court added that in the latter
instance only those acts undertaken on behalf of the parent may be con-
sidered as factors under the doing business test.57 Moreover, the court
noted, the agency relationship must continue unchanged until the time of
service of process in order to satisfy the presence/doing business test's
requirement of current presence.58 Because the government failed to
demonstrate that the agency relationship between International and
Marc Rich & Co. continued beyond 1980 and 1981, the district court
ruled that "if doing business were the only ground for jurisdiction in this
case, we would. . . quash the Subpoena.
59
After the district court rejected the assertion of jurisdiction on the
basis of the presence/doing business test, it considered the government's
claim that federal criminal jurisdiction could rest on Marc Rich & Co.'s
past transactions within the state that were the subject of the grand jury
investigation.60 The district court judge, however, may have failed to
realize that the government was proposing that the transaction of busi-
52 See infra § V of this Note.
53 See infra § V A of this Note.
54 Marc Rich, No. M-11-188, slip op. at 10-11.
55 Id. See supra note 7.
56 Marc Rich, No. M-11-188, slip op. at 11. See also Saraceno v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 83
F.R.D. 65, 68-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). If the subsidiary is an agent for the parent, the subsidiary's
activities can be attributed to the parent. Id. at 68. If the subsidiary is a department of the parent,
based upon the parent's control of the subsidiary's day-to-day operations, then the subsidiary's activ-
ities can also be attributed to the parent. Id. at 69.
57 Marc Rich, No. M-11-188, slip op. at 11.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 14; see Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 517 (1923).
60 Marc Rich, No. M-11-188, slip op. at 14.
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ness test be adopted as a federal standard of criminal jurisdiction.61 The
court sought to determine whether the transaction of business test com-
plied with the New York long-arm statute, instead of viewing the test as
a federal standard of criminal jurisdiction. 2
By analyzing the New York long-arm statute, the district court ap-
peared to view the jurisdictional issue as a purely state law question. It is
more likely, however, that the district court's reference to the state long-
arm statute was for the purpose of analogy only. Indeed, the district
court stated that the state long-arm statute applies to civil cases and ac-
knowledged that the action before it was not a civil cause of action.6
In reviewing the statute, the district court determined that the stat-
ute "reveal[ed] a legislative intent to confer jurisdiction [only] where the
subject matter of the litigation is related to the contacts with the jurisdic-
tion."" The court added that because "the grand jury [was] investigat-
ing particular transactions in which International allegedly acted on
A.G.'s [Marc Rich & Co.] behalf in this state,"'65 the court held that
"[t]hese alleged transactions on behalf of A.G. would undoubtedly pro-
vide the minimum contacts needed to comport with 'traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice required by due process.' "66 Thus,
the district court rejected Marc Rich & Co.'s argument that only general
jurisdiction, through the application of a presence/doing business test, is
a valid basis of criminal jurisdiction, and found that the transacting busi-
ness test conformed with both state law and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.67 The district court thus became the first court to apply the
transacting business test as a basis for criminal jurisdiction in a federal
case.
B. The Court of Appeals' Assertion of Jurisdiction
Over Marc Rich & Co.
The court of appeals also ruled that it had jurisdiction over Marc
61 Id at 15.
62 In responding to the district court's discussion of the New York long-arm statute, the govern-
ment asserted that the district court may merely have made reference to state law as an analogy.
Brief for the United States of America at 8, In Re Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.
1983) (available in the Northwestern University Journal of International Law & Business Office)
[hereinafter cited as Governments' Brief].
63 The court stated, "[Iln considering whether the 'transaction of business' is a sufficient basis for
the assertion of jurisdiction, we naturally turn to the New York long-arm statute." Marc Rich, No.
M-11-188, slip op. at 15. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 302(a)(1).
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Rich & Co. The court first appeared to assert jurisdiction on the basis of
the detrimental consequences test,68 but later it asserted jurisdiction on
the basis of three sets of facts. First, there was a conspiracy to evade
United States income tax laws and some of the conspiratorial acts took
place within the United States.69 Second, Marc Rich & Co.'s alleged
violation of United States income tax laws occurred with the cooperation
of International, which was authorized to do business in New York.7 0
Third, two of the board members of Marc Rich & Co. and International
resided in the United States.71 Based upon these circumstances, the
court of appeals asserted its jurisdiction over Marc Rich & Co.
First, the court of appeals stated that "both the conspiracy and at
least some of the conspiratorial acts occurred in the United States."7"
The court, however, failed to explain which theory of jurisdiction this
fact related to. The court of appeals did, however, immediately cite a
United States court of appeals decision. In the case cited, Melia v. United
States,73 the court ruled that when the defendant made telephone calls,
relating to the underlying crime, into Canada, this constituted the per-
formance of acts within Canada in furtherance of the conspiracy. Simi-
larly, a United States court would have jurisdiction had the calls been
made to the United States.74 The court in Melia ruled that "[t]he mere
presence of a conspiracy within Canada has a detrimental effect within
Canada."75 Thus, it appears that when the court of appeals in Marc Rich
spoke of conspiratorial acts within the United States, the court was ap-
plying the detrimental consequences theory of'jurisdiction. By emphasiz-
ing the fact that at least some of the conspiratorial acts took place within
the United States, however, the court of appeals was also applying the
transaction of business test. Under the transaction of business test, if a
foreign defendant engages in any activity within the United States which
activity serves as the basis for the cause of action, a United States court
will have jurisdiction over the defendant.76
68 In Re Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d at 667. "[W]e have subscribed to the 'modern notion'
that where a person has sufficiently caused adverse consequences within a state, he may be subjected
to its judicial jurisdiction." Id.




73 667 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981) (court extradicted Melia to Canada based upon determination
that Canadian courts had jurisdiction over Melia).
74 Id. at 304.
75 Id.
76 See supra note 8; see also International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 320. "The obliga-
tion which is here sued upon arose out of those very activities [which took place in the state of
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The second fact which the court of appeals based jurisdiction upon
was that Marc Rich & Co.'s alleged violation of United States income tax
laws had occurred with the cooperation of International. The court did
not explain how this fact related to a particular test or theory of jurisdic-
tion. The court did specifically state, however, that International was
authorized to do business in New York. It is clear that a United States
court could have jurisdiction over International since it was licensed and
regularly did business in New York. Perhaps the court of appeals deter-
mined that it had jurisdiction over Marc Rich & Co. because Interna-
tional was acting either as an agent or department of Marc Rich & Co.,
making International's actions the actions of Marc Rich & Co.
In Saraceno v. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc.,7 the court declared that a
foreign parent corporation could be deemed "present" in New York if
"(1) the relationship between the foreign parent and the local subsidiary
give rise to a valid inference of an agency relationship or (2) the control
by the parent of the subsidiary is so complete that the subsidiary is, in
fact, merely a department of the parent."7 8 If the subsidiary does all the
business in New York which the parent corporation would do if it were
in New York by its own officers, then an agency relationship exists.7 9 If
the parent controls the day-to-day operations of its subsidiary to the ex-
tent that the subsidiary's officers and board of directors are reduced to
subservient activity, then the subsidiary is a mere department of the
parent. 80
The United States government argued that International acted as
Marc Rich & Co.'s agent.8" The district court ruled, however, that the
agency relationship must continue unchanged in order for the court to
have jurisdiction of Marc Rich & Co. under the presence/doing business
test. Since this relationship between International and Marc Rich, if- it
existed at all, only existed in 1980 and 1981, the court ruled that it did
not have jurisdiction over Marc Rich & Co. on this basis.82 Thus, when
Washington]... these operations establish sufficient cntacts ... to enforce the obligations which
appellant has incurred here." Id.
77 83 F.R.D. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The parent company in Saraceno was licensed to do business
in New York and the court ruled that the foreign subsidiary was not a mere department or agent of
the parent, thus the court granted the foreign subsidiary's motion for dismissal for lack of personam
jurisdiction under the presence/doing business test of jurisdiction. Id
78 Id. at 68.
79 Id. at 67.
80 Id.
81 Marc Rich, No. M-11-188, slip op. at 11.
82 Id. at 14; see Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 517 (1923) (the
defendant must be "doing business" in the jurisdiction at the time of service of process for jurisdic-
tion to exist under the presence/doing business test).
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the court of appeals stated that Marc Rich & Co.'s violation of United
States laws occurred with the cooperation of International, the court may
have been applying the presence/doing business test of jurisdiction.
Finally, the third fact upon which the court of appeals asserted ju-
risdiction over Marc Rich & Co. was that two of the board members of
Marc Rich & Co. resided in the United States. This fact also appears to
have had jurisdictional significance under the presence/doing business
test since, in other cases, courts have held that the presence of company
officers or directors in a jurisdiction serves as a basis for finding that the
company was "present" in the jurisdiction and therefore subject to suits
in the jurisdiction. 3
When the court of appeals asserted jurisdiction over Marc Rich &
Co., it did so on the basis of three sets of facts which relate to three
separate theories of jurisdiction: the detrimental consequences theory,
the presence/doing business theory, and the transacting business theory.
Like the district court, the court of appeals was unable to assert jurisdic-
tion solely on the presence/doing business theory. The inability to assert
jurisdiction over Marc Rich & Co. on the sole basis of the presence/
doing business test underscores the inadequacy of this test, and empha-
sizes the usefulness of the transacting business test and the detrimental
consequences test in meeting the United States' need to preserve its abil-
ity to prosecute alleged criminal violations of its laws.
The court of appeals also ruled that the district court erred in look-
ing to New York's long-arm statute to determine whether it had personal
jurisdiction over Marc Rich & Co.84 The court reasoned that because the
subject of the grand jury's investigation in the case was the possible viola-
tion of federal revenue statutes, the grand jury's right to compel docu-
ment production from Marc Rich & Co. depended upon Marc Rich &
Co.'s contacts with the entire United States and not simply New York.85
Nevertheless, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's assertion
of jurisdiction over Marc Rich & Co. and rejected Marc Rich & Co.'s
argument that "ratification of the service upon it of the subpoena would
be tantamount to creating a novel federal long-arm rule without congres-
sional authority."86
83 See In Re Canadian Int'l Paper Co., 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), which the court of
appeals cited to for support of its ruling of jurisdiction. In ruling that it had jurisdiction over the
foreign corporation under the presence/doing business test, the court in In Re Canadian noted that
the Canadian coniipany's president, two vice-presidents, and treasurer resided in the United States.
Id. at 1020.
84 In Re Marc Rich, 707 F.2d at 667.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 668-69 (quoting from Marc Rich & Co.'s brief). Marc Rich & Co. had argued that 28
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The court of appeals ruled that the district court should not have
relied upon the New York long-arm statute to determine whether juris-
diction existed. 7 According to this author's reading of the opinion, how-
ever, the court did not base its ruling on the belief that the transacting
business test is too broad. The court of appeals, in dicta, asserted that it
had jurisdiction over Marc Rich & Co. under the detrimental conse-
quences test,88 which in some respects can be an even broader basis of
jurisdiction than the transacting business test. For example, under the
detrimental consequences test, a court may assert its jurisdiction over a
foreign defendant who has no contacts with the United States other than
an alleged violation of United States law.89 Under the transacting busi-
ness test, however, the foreign defendant must have violated United
States law within the United States itself.90
In this author's opinion, the court of appeals thus rejected the trans-
acting business test because the district court improperly applied the test
through the New York long-arm statute,91 and not because the court
considered it to be a radical or unwise extension of federal jurisdiction.
U.S.C. § 1783 (1982) (which governs the subpoena of persons in a foreign country) controlled the
case. Section 1783, Marc Rich & Co. contended, is silent as to foreign corporations which are not
nationals or residents of the United States, and accordingly, those corporations are not subject to a
subpoena regardless of the place and manner of service. Id. at 668. Disagreeing with Marc Rich &
Co.'s interpretation of the statute, however, the court of appeals stated that § 1783 applied only
where the subpoena is served in a foreign country. In the instant case, noted the court, the subpoena
had been served upon Marc Rich & Co.'s agents within the United States. Id.
Moreover, said the court, "A.G.'s argument puts the cart before the horse. A federal court's
jurisdiction is not determined by its power to issue a subpoena; its power to issue a subpoena is
determined by its jurisdiction." Id. at 669.
Finally, the government maintained that, "[t]here is in fact no governing federal statute or
controlling precedent leaving the District Court, and this Court, free to determine the appropriate-
ness of the assertion of in personam power on the facts of this case in light of principles of fairness
and applicable federal policies." Government's Brief, supra note 62, at 10.
The government argued that § 1783 did not apply since, on its face, the statute deals with
individuals who are residents or citizens of the United States, and not with corporations. Id. at 11.
The government cited a district court decision which rejected the argument that § 1783 applies to
corporations. In Re Arawak Trust Co., 489 F. Supp. 162, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). "It is not reason-
able to impute to Congress a purpose to immunize from process non-resident foreign corporations
conducting substantial and continuous activities here. The purpose of the legislation was rather to
provide a means to make service on nationals or residents of this country who were physically
outside it." Id. at 165. (investigation of fraud; order compelling production of documents denied
due to lack of jurisdiction).
87 In Re Marc Rich, 707 F.2d at 668.
88 Id. at 667.
89 See supra note 23.
90 See supra note 8.
91 In Re Marc Rich, 707 F.2d at 667.
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE THREE STANDARDS OF JURISDICTION
A. Case Law Supports the Application of
All Three Standards of Jurisdiction
The courts could have complied with precedent by applying any of
the three jurisdiction standards to the Marc Rich facts. The United
States Supreme Court and lower federal courts have applied both the
presence/doing business test and the detrimental consequences test when
determining whether criminal jurisdiction exists.9 2 The district court and
court of appeals could also have applied the transaction of business test
without conflicting with precedent.93 Although in the past courts have
used the transacting business test in civil matters, nothing bars the courts
from using this or any other test in criminal cases so long as the test does
not violate due process of law requirements.94 Although no court before
Marc Rich ever directly applied the transaction of business test to deter-
mine whether criminal jurisdiction exists, one state supreme court indi-
rectly grounded criminal jurisdiction on this basis,95 and one federal
court of appeals indirectly affirmed the application of this test for crimi-
nal jurisdiction.96 Finally, the United States Supreme Court, albeit in a
civil case, found specific jurisdiction over a defendant on the basis of the
transaction of business test.
97
92 See supra notes 7 and 23. The American Law Institute, in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 27 ratified the detrimental consequences test. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit applied the Restatement formulation of the test in Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972)..
93 See supra notes 17 and 18.
94 One aspect of due process of law with regard to jurisdictional tests is whether it would be
unreasonably burdensome for the defendant to respond to the suit in the particular jurisdiction.
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317. Another aspect is whether the defendant could have reasonably
foreseen a suit in the jurisdiction. Leasco Data, 468 F.2d at 1342.
95 State v. Luv Pharmacy, Inc., 188 N.H. 398, 406-407, 388 A.2d 190, 195 (1979). Though the
court in Luv first rejected the application of the transacting business test of criminal jurisdiction due
to the possibility that judgment could be rendered against a defendant while absent from the state, it
later stated that the commission of illegal acts within a state is a "compelling circumstance of affilia-
tion with the state and a basis of jurisdiction." Id.
96 Leasco Data, 468 F.2d at 1341. The court in this case specifically stated that the defendant's
activity within the United States had not been the basis for the cause of action. The court would not
have highlighted the presence or absence of this fact unless it had some legal significance. The court
therefore impliedly ruled that had the defendant's activity within the United States been the basis for
the cause of action, this would have jurisdictional significance. Thus, the court indirectly affirmed
the application of the transaction of business test for criminal jurisdiction, since under the transac-
tion of business test, if the defendant's activity within the United States is the basis for the cause of
action, this will support jurisdiction.
97 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320. In the holding, the Court emphasized that although the
defendant's commission of some single or occasional activity within the state did iot normally confer
jurisdiction upon the court, if these acts within the state formed the basis of the cause of action, a
finding of jurisdiction "can in most instances, hardly be said to be undue." Id.
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B. The Balancing of Interests in Fashioning a Future Federal
Standard of Jurisdiction
This author has identified at least four major interests of the United
States which might be considered when fashioning a future federal stan-
dard of criminal jurisdiction. First, the United States has a strong inter-
est in preserving its right to prosecute alleged violations of its laws.9"
The courts would have to adopt a broad theory of jurisdiction in order to
favor this interest because the broader the theory of jurisdiction (in the
sense that less activity in the jurisdiction would be necessary to a finding
of jurisdiction), the more difficult it will be for foreign defendants to vio-
late United States laws and not be subject to a United States court's juris-
diction. There are, however, three competing interests which would lead
a court to conclude that a more limited theory of jurisdiction should be
adopted. These are: the United States' interest in maintaining and fur-
thering its position as an international center for trade and in promoting
healthy political and economic relations with other countries, 99 the
United States' interest in securing due process of law for potential de-
fendants,"°° and the United States' interest in setting an international
precedent which will protect United States corporations from unfair or
surprise suits in other countries.101
The presence/doing business test fails to protect the United States'
interest in prosecuting alleged violations of its laws. Under this test, a
98 See In Re Elec. & Musical Indus., 155 F. Supp. 892, 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). (grand jury investi-
gation; jurisdiction over defendant supporting subpoena of defendant) "We may still indulge in a
heavy handed fiction of corporation personality to protect a parent corporation from service outside
of a state in which it is active but there is a clear warning in Scophony that such a fiction is not to be
used to protect the parent [corporation] from being served at all particularly in a proceeding under
the antitrust laws." Id. See also United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795 (1948) (charge of
Sherman Act violation; court has jurisdiction); Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 363 (1912).
99 See eg., In the Matter of Arawak Trust Co., Ltd., 489 F. Supp. 162, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
"Doubtless the use of foreign corporations to facilitate the federal crime is not to be encouraged. On
the other hand it is desirable to maintain the United States as a center for commerce throughout the
world." Id.
100 World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (products liability action; no
jurisdiction). The court stated that even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience
in responding to the suit and even if the state had a strong interest in prosecuting the case, the due
process clause, requiring that the defendant reasonably anticipated a suit in that state, can divest the
state of its jurisdiction. However, World Wide Volkswagen was a civil case in which the plaintiffs
could always sue the defendants in a New York state court where the plaintiffs had maintained
"minimum contacts."
101 In Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1342 (2d Cir. 1972), the
court refused to assert its jurisdiction in order to avoid a reciprocal assertion of jurisdiction by other
courts over United States citizens and corporations. The court stated, not only would "accountants
operating solely in London. . .be subjected to personal jurisdiction in any country whose citizen
had purchased stock of a company they had audited; the same would be true, of course, of account-
ants operating solely in the United States." Id.
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potential defendant can violate United States law with impunity while
easily structuring its activities in order to avoid the systematic and con-
tinuous contacts with the United States which are necessary to satisfy the
presence/doing business test. The activities of Marc Rich & Co. provide
a good example of how a foreign corporation can knowingly violate
United States laws and yet escape prosecution in the United States under
the presence/doing business test of jurisdiction. The district court ex-
plicitly ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over Marc Rich & Co. under the
presence/doing business test because the company did not regularly do
business in the United States through continuous and systematic contacts
or through the maintainance of an office, bank accounts, or other formal
indicia of doing business in the United States. 102
Nevertheless, the presence/doing business test does promote the
United States' interest in securing due process of law for potential de-
fendants. If a defendant is doing business in a jurisdiction, it probably
has sufficient contacts with the jurisdiction to ensure that responding to a
suit in that jurisdiction would not be unduly costly or inconvenient. The
concern over inconvenience to the defendant in responding to a suit in
the particular jurisdiction, though strong in the past, has in recent years
become less important to the courts. Due to technological advances in
travel, in the past few decades United States courts have rarely found
that they lacked jurisdiction because the defendant would be inconve-
nienced by responding to the suit.1"' Moreover, if the defendant is a
multinational corporation, the company most likely will have the re-
sources to defend lawsuits in countries other than those in which the
company is principally located.
Currently, the courts that interpret the due process requirement are
not concerned with the cost and inconvenience to the defendant in re-
sponding to the suit;1°4 rather courts emphasize that in order to satisfy
due process of law the defendant must have reasonably anticipated that
102 Marc Rich, No. M-11-188, slip op. at 14.
103 See, e.g., McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957). "[M]odern transportation
and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State
where he engages in economic activity." Id. (beneficiary under an insurance contract, a resident of
California, sued its insurer, a Texas corporation, for recovery under its insurance policy; the
Supreme Court ruled that the California state court had jurisdiction over the Texas corporation) Id
See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-251 (1958). A Florida court ruled that a trust agree-
ment making a Delaware trust company a trustee of certain securities was ineffective under Florida
law. The Supreme Court held that the Florida court lacked jurisdiction over the Delaware company
due to a lack of minimum contacts of the defendant in Florida. The Court stated that, due to the less
burdensome nature of defending a suit in a foreign tribunal, the Court's rulings on the requirements
for personal jurisdiction have "evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff. . . to the flexible
standard of International Shoe." Id.
104 Id.
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Defendants
6:615(1984)
his actions could lead to litigation in a particular forum. 10 5 Because the
defendant, under the presence/doing business test, must be engaged in
continuous and systematic business in a particular jursidiction, the de-
fendant should reasonably anticipate that these activities could expose it
to litigation in that forum. 106 Nevertheless, the presence/doing business
test is a form of general jurisdiction. 1 7 Therefore, the defendant also
may be subject to litigation in that jurisdiction for claims based upon the
defendant's actions outside of the jurisdiction. 108 Thus, the defendant
might not reasonably anticipate litigation of certain claims in the United
States.
The continued application of the presence/doing business jurisdic-
tion test in criminal cases probably will promote the United States' inter-
ests in maintaining healthy political relations with other co'untries and in
encouraging international trade with United States companies because,
for a court to have jurisdiction, the defendant must maintain continuous
and systematic contacts with the United States rather than merely single
or occasional contacts. Moreover, due to the requirement of continuous
and systematic contacts, the application of jurisdiction on this basis by
foreign courts over United States citizens or companies would be more
desirable to these citizens or companies than the assertion of jurisdiction
on the basis of less systematic contacts. The adoption of the presence/
doing business test by foreign countries will tend to limit their ability to
assert jurisdiction over United States defendants because the test requires
continuous and systematic contacts with the foreign jurisdiction by the
United States defendant. Thus, if a United States citizen or corporation
wants to avoid a lawsuit in a particular country in which it conducts
some business, the citizen or corporation can avoid that suit by limiting
its activities within the country so that they are not systematic and
continuous. 109
Though the presence/doing business test furthers the United States'
interests in securing due process of law for potential defendants, in main-
taining the United States' position as a center for international trade, and
in promoting good relations between the United States and other coun-
105 See supra note 100.
106 See supra note 7.
107 See supra note 26.
108 Id.
109 Had the district court in Marc Rich not applied the transacting business test, it would not
have found jurisdiction over Marc Rich & Co. "If 'doing business' were the only ground for jurisdic-
tion in this case, we would ... quash the subpoena." Marc Rich, No. M-11-188, slip op. at 14. As
the court stated at the very beginning of its opinion, "AG [Marc Rich & Co.] claims that it has
deliberately structured its business to avoid any contact with the United States.. ." Id. at 1.
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tries, the test clearly fails to protect the United States' interest in prose-
cuting alleged violations of its laws. The presence/doing business test
fails to protect the United States' interest in prosecuting alleged viola-
tions of its laws because, under this test, a foreign defendant, by structur-
ing its activities to avoid systematic and continuous contact with the
United States, can transact some business in the United States, violate
United States law, and avoid a United States court's jurisdiction.
The transaction of business test also must be rejected as an inade-
quate federal standard of criminal jurisdiction because it fails to meet the
United States' various interests. The transacting business test has one
advantage over the presence/doing business test; it allows a court to as-
sert jurisdiction over foreign defendants even if the defendants do not
regularly conduct business within the jurisdiction.' Thus, the transact-
ing business test would prevent a foreign defendant from violating United
States law and from structuring its activities in order to avoid a United
States court's jurisdiction."'
The transacting business test contains one loophole, however. The
foreign defendant must have had some contact with the United States
and this contact must have created the basis of the lawsuit." 2 If a for-
eign defendant violates United States law and the contact it has with the
United States does not form the basis of the lawsuit, then a United States
court applying this test would be forced to conclude that it lacked juris-
diction over the foreign defendant." 3 Thus, a foreign defendant may be
able to structure its activities to avoid United States jurisdiction under
the transacting business test as well.
Of the three jurisdiction tests used by the courts, the transacting
business test affords a potential defendant the least amount of due pro-
cess protection because it could require a foreign defendant to respond to
a suit which may be very inconvenient and costly. For example, under
the transacting business test, jurisdiction may be asserted over a foreign
defendant whose only contact with the United States is a telephone
call,' ' while under the presence/doing business test, the foreign defend-
ant must regularly conduct business within the United States.' In addi-
tion, under the transacting business test, jurisdiction may be asserted
110 See supra note 8.
111 For example, in Marc Rich, Marc Rich & Co. was unable to violate United States law without
being subject to United States jurisdiction under the transacting business test. Marc Rich, No. M-
11-188, slip op.
112 See supra note 8.
113 Id.
114 See Melia v. United States, 667 F.2d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 1981).
115 See supra note 7.
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Defendants
6:615(1984)
over defendants who may be acting in the United States, but who reason-
ably believe that the effects of their actions would only reach another
country where their actions may be legal. These defendants might unex-
pectedly find that their actions have been deemed by a court to have
illegally affected the United States, and thus they might find themselves
subject to a lawsuit in the United States. Thus, there may be cases where
the transacting business test might not satisfy the due process require-
ment that the defendant reasonably anticipate a lawsuit in a particular
forum.
The application of the transacting business test for criminal jurisdic-
tion over foreign defendants probably will not adversely affect the United
States' interest in maintaining good relations with other countries and in
maintaining the United States' position as an international trade center
for three reasons. First, United States state courts and federal courts
under diversity jurisdiction already apply the transacting business test of
jurisdiction to foreign defendants in civil cases." 6 Thus, application of
this jurisdictional test to criminal cases probably will not deter foreign
business activity in the United States. Second, the current federal stan-
dard of jurisdiction in civil cases, the minimum contacts theory of juris-
diction, can also be a broad basis of jurisdiction. It appears, upon a
careful reading of the International Shoe decision, that the United States
Supreme Court ruled that a court could have jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant based upon even a single act of the defendant within the juris-
diction, if the act in the jurisdiction served as the basis for the cause of
action being litigated in the jurisdiction." 7 Third, United States courts
currently apply the detrimental consequences test of jurisdiction in crimi-
nal cases, which in some respects can be an even broader theory of juris-
diction than the transacting business test.
The application of the transacting business test in the United States
could induce other countries' courts to reciprocally apply this test of ju-
risdiction to United States citizens or corporations. The United States
would not want to have foreign countries adopt the transacting business
test for the same reasons foreign corporations do not want to have the
United States courts adopt this test. If the transacting business test were
adopted by a foreign country's courts, it might subject United States cor-
porations to lawsuits in the foreign country for unintentional violations
116 See, eg., Lehigh Valley Indus., Inc. v. Birenbaum, 527 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1975). The court of
appeals held that the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant transacted business in New York,
thus the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
117 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319-20 (1945).
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of that country's laws, 118 and it might allow jurisdiction to be based upon
the insignificant contacts the United States corporation might have with
the foreign country.
Thus, while the transacting business test better secures the United
States' interest in prosecuting alleged violations of United States laws
than the presence/doing business test,' 19 it may provide defendants with
inadequate due process of law protections. Moreover, the adoption of
the transacting business test may also deter some multinational compa-
nies from conducting business in the United States, sour the United
States' relations with other countries, and induce foreign courts to recip-
rocally assert a broad-based jurisdictional test against United States citi-
zens and corporations.
The third jurisdictional test which the courts might use, the detri-
mental consequences test, best balances the interests which must be taken
into consideration in fashioning a future federal standard of criminal ju-
risdiction. The detrimental consequences test best protects the United
States' interest in prosecuting alleged violations of its laws, because under
this test a United States court will have jurisdiction to hear the case any
time foreign defendants allegedly commit a knowing violation of United
States criminal laws. Only if foreign defendants violate United States
laws without knowing that their actions would constitute a violation of
United States law would a United States court lack jurisdiction. Since
many crimes require, as an element of the crime, that the accused actu-
ally know that its actions constitute a violation of the law,' 20 the jurisdic-
tional requirement of "knowingly" violating the law will not impede the
government's ability to prosecute criminal violations of United States
laws.
Unlike the transacting business test, the detrimental consequences
test broadly protects the United States' interest in prosecuting violations
of its laws, while adequately protecting the defendants' interests in ob-
118 See supra note 8. There is no intent requirement under the transacting business test as there is
under the detrimental consequences test.
119 A court could assert jurisdiction over a defendant on the basis of a defendant's single act in
the United States under the transacting business test. See supra text accompanying note 114.
120 For instance, the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) is
very selective in recommending criminal prosecution of tax violations. Of the 136 million tax re-
turns filed each year, the I.R.S. closely examines about 2.2 million and the Criminal Investigation
Division recommends on the average, prosecution against only 3,000, obtaining convictions in about
87% of the cases actually prosecuted. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Annual Report 30 (1978)
reprinted in M. SALTZMAN, I.R.S. PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 12.01, n.3 (1983). The I.R.S. will
criminally prosecute only in instances of willful misconduct by the taxpayer in which the taxpayer
intentionally violated a known legal duty. Id. The I.R.S. will examine the taxpayer's education or
lack thereof to determine if the violation was intentional. Id. § 12.03(3)(b)-(3)(c).
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taining due process of law.121 Indeed, the detrimental consequences test
may best satisfy the due process requirement because that test requires
that the defendants knowingly violate a jurisdiction's laws. 122 This scien-
ter requirement guarantees that the defendants could reasonably antici-
pate suit in a particular forum and thus would be assured of their due
process protection. 123 Although it is more likely that under the pres-
ence/doing business test defendants will be able to respond to suits with
less inconvenience and cost than under the detrimental consequences
test, some courts have subordinated the issue of inconvenience to the de-
fendant in responding to the suit when the defendant is charged with
criminal acts, due to the United States' strong interest in prosecuting this
type of case.
124
Of the three jurisdiction tests used by the courts, the detrimental
consequences test appears to be the best for promoting the United States'
interest in maintaining good relations with other countries and for en-
couraging more multinational companies to do business in the United
States because it will not subject foreign defendants to suits in the United
States for any actions that they have taken within or outside the United
States so long as they have not knowingly violated United States law.
One result of this test may be that multinational corporations and other
foreign defendants might structure their conduct to avoid criminal suits
in the United States simply by not knowingly violating United States
laws. Thus, the detrimental consequences test might encourage multina-
tional companies to become more active within the United States, be-
cause their activities in the United States would not in and of themselves
make them vulnerable to suit in the United States as they would under
the presence/doing business test.
125
If United States courts apply the detrimental consequences theory of
jurisdiction over foreign defendants, other countries' courts might recip-
rocally apply this test of jurisdiction over United States citizens or corpo-
rations. The United States would probably be pleased if foreign countries
adopted this standard because under it, a foreign country could only as-
sert jurisdiction over United States citizens or companies which know-
ingly violate the foreign country's laws.' 26 There is, however, one
problem with having foreign courts apply the detrimental consequences
test; a foreign court might presume that the defendant knowingly vio-
121 See supra text accompanying notes 114-15.
122 See supra note 23.
123 Id.
124 See supra text accompanying note 103.
125 See supra note 26.
126 See supra note 23.
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lated its laws when defendants actually may have been unaware of the
fact that their actions constituted a violation of a country's criminal laws.
The American Law Institute has addressed the potential problems
associated with the detrimental consequences test by stating that the
plaintiff should be required to demonstrate that the defendant's conduct
and its effects are generally recognized as elements of a crime or of a tort
under the laws of nations with developed legal systems, and that the vio-
lation of the law was a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct.1
27 If
foreign courts adopted this standard, then United States citizens and cor-
porations probably would not object to having foreign courts apply the
detrimental consequences test to determine whether jurisdiction exists.
Of the three tests of jurisdiction, the detrimental consequences test
best meets the United States' diverging interests, because it not only pro-
tects the United States' interest in prosecuting knowing violations of its
criminal laws, but it also satisfies due process of law requirements.
Moreover, United States citizens and corporations would find the detri-
mental consequences test to be a desirable theory of jurisdiction for for-
eign courts to apply to them.
The presence/doing business test inadequately protects the United
States' interest in prosecuting alleged violations of its criminal laws be-
cause it requires the defendant to maintain continuous and systematic
contacts with the United States before jurisdiction will be established.
Thus, the presence/doing business test would allow foreign corporations
to violate United States law with impunity by structuring their activities
so that United States courts would lack jurisdiction. Moreover, while the
doing business test best protects the defendant from inconvenient and
expensive suits, courts have given the government's interest in prosecut-
ing alleged violations of its criminal laws priority over the defendant's
interest in preventing inconvenient and expensive lawsuits.128 Applica-
tion of the presence/doing business test of jurisdiction in criminal cases is
particularly ill-advised due to the United States' strong interest in prose-
cuting criminal violations of its laws. Finally, since the presence/doing
business test supports general jurisdiction it is more likely to discourage
international trade with the United States than would the detrimental
consequences test.
The transacting business test also fails to serve the United States'
interests. Not only may the transacting business test violate due process
of law requirements by establishing jurisdiction over defendants who
could not reasonably foresee that their actions could lead to a lawsuit in
127 See supra note 23.
128 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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the United States, but it also may allow foreign courts to establish juris-
diction over United States citizens or corporations that had not know-
ingly violated the plaintiff's country's laws.
C. There Should Be a Uniform Federal Standard of Criminal
Jurisdiction Based Upon the Detrimental
Consequences Test
To date, lower federal courts have either applied one of the three
jurisdiction theories discussed in this Note, or combined all three theo-
ries when determining whether they have jurisdiction over foreign de-
fendants.'29 Because United States courts have failed to adopt a specific
federal standard of criminal jurisdiction, 3 ' foreign individuals or compa-
nies cannot reasonably anticipate when they will be subject to litigation
in the United States. In addition, this uncertainty will prevent foreign
companies from structuring their activities to avoid suit in the United
States. Foreign companies' inability to know whether their activities in
the United States will subject them to the United States courts' jurisdic-
tion might not only deter some multinational companies from engaging
in activity in the United States, it might also deny due process of law to
those foreign defendants who have engaged in business with United
States citizens or companies.
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that due process of law
requires "a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows poten-
tial defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to
suit."'' Potential foreign defendants, however, do not currently enjoy
this predictability because neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has
developed a uniform federal standard of criminal jurisdiction.'32 Thus,
potential defendants must act without knowing whether their actions will
render them liable to suit because they do not know what standard of
jurisdiction a court might apply. In this sense, the lower federal courts'
application of various standards might violate the due process clause be-
cause foreign defendants will not be able to reasonably anticipate
129 See, e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972)
(court cited to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws for three bases of finding jurisdiction:
(1) doing business in the jurisdiction, (2) causing an effect in the jurisdiction, or (3) doing an act in
the jurisdiction. Id. at 1340; see supra § II B of this Note for a discussion of how the court of appeals
in Marc Rich combined all three theories of jurisdiction in asserting jurisdiction over Marc Rich &
Co.
130 See supra note 17-18.
131 World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
132 See supra notes 17-18.
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whether their actions will render them liable to suit in the jurisdiction.
13 3
Congress or the Supreme Court should develop a uniform standard
of criminal jurisdiction to end the existing confusion. This uniform stan-
dard should not combine all three jurisdiction theories, in the sense of
asserting jurisdiction on the basis of any of the three theories, because
this combination would create a very broad standard which would prob-
ably harm the United States' interest in maintaining good relations with
other countries and in encouraging international trade with the United
States. In addition, foreign countries could adopt this trifurcated test
and could reciprocally assert it against United States citizens and corpo-
rations. Therefore, a uniform federal standard of jurisdiction should be
based upon a single theory of jurisdiction which can best meet the United
States' varying interests-the detrimental consequences test.
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT'S AND COURT OF APPEALS' ALLOCATION
OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF
As important as the standard of jurisdiction is, the government's
ability to prosecute alleged violations of the law will be equally affected
by the initial showing a court requires a plaintiff to make when a defend-
ant moves to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The greater the burden
placed on the plaintiff prior to discovery, the less likely it is that the
plaintiff will be able to satisfy it. Nevertheless, a plaintiff must make
some showing that the court has jurisdiction so that defendants will be
protected from frivolous suits.
In Marc Rich, the district court ruled that the government had to
make a prima facie showing134 of jurisdiction in order to avoid dismissal
and to require Marc Rich & Co. to produce the requested documents.1 35
The government met this preliminary burden by using affidavits "which
support[ed] its allegations that International directed income from the
resale of oil purchased from A.G. offshore to A.G. in a manner designed
to avoid United States taxes."1 36 After the government made this pre-
133 See supra note 131.
134 To satisfy this standard, the plaintiff cannot merely allege conclusory statements, but must
allege specific facts which would establish jurisdiction and the cause of action. Lehigh Valley Indus.,
Inc. v. Birenbaum, 527 F.2d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 1975) (defendant charged with breach of contract,
conspiracy to divert assets, and misappropriation of a business opportunity; court held jurisdiction
did not exist because the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant transacted business in New
York or committed tortious acts in or outside New York which would give the district court juris-
diction over the defendant).
135 Marc Rich, No. M-11-188, slip op. at 10.
136 Id. at 16.
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liminary "good faith"' 37 jurisdiction showing, the district court ruled
that Marc Rich & Co. had the burden of persuading the court that the
transactions between the two companies took place at arm's length,1
38
and that International's losses did not indicate that it was directing in-
come offshore to Marc Rich & Co. in a manner designed to avoid United
States taxes. 139 Since Marc Rich & Co. did not meet this burden, the
district court ruled that jurisdiction existed and the subpoena would be
enforced.' 4
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision that the
government's affidavits sufficed to show jurisdiction and ordered Marc
Rich & Co. to comply with the grand jury's subpoena duces tecum.141
The court of appeals, however, required the government to make more
than a prima facie showing of jurisdiction in order to meet its burden of
proof. Instead, the court of appeals ruled that the government must es-
tablish a "reasonable probability of ultimate success" in proving the facts
necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction. 42 The court ruled it would
order compliance with the grand jury's subpoena only if this showing
were made. The court applied the "reasonable probability of ultimate
success" test instead of the prima facie test because it deemed ordering
compliance with the subpoena to be tantamount to the granting of an
injunction. 43 The court stated, "when the defendant in a civil case chal-
lenges the grant of a temporary injunction on the ground that the court is
without personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff is required to establish only a
reasonable probability of ultimate success on this issue."'" The decision
upon which the court of appeals relied, however, specifically involved the
granting of a preliminary injunction and not an order for the compliance
137 The district court interchangeably spoke of aprimafacie or good faith showing. The court
probably meant prima facie when it used the term "good faith".
138 Marc Rich, No. M-11-188, slip op. at 17. The district court did not state how Marc Rich &
Co. could prove arms-length transactions with International but did state that because Marc Rich &
Co. failed to explain the massive losses incurred by International, Marc Rich & Co. had not met its
burden of proof. Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Marc Rich, 707 F.2d at 670.
142 Id.
143 The court of appeals cited Visual Sciences, Inc. v. Integrated Communications, Inc., 660 F.2d
56 (2d Cir. 1981) (stockholders suit, preliminary injunction denied), which applied the reasonable
probability test as opposed to the prima facie test because the plaintiff sought preliminary injunctive
relief which required the court to have personal jurisdiction over the defendants. "In the absence of
a full-blown hearing on the merits, plaintiff need make only aprimafacie showing that the court has
jurisdiction... Aprimafacie showing will not suffice, however, where a plaintiff seeks preliminary
injunctive relief." Id. at 58-59.
144 Marc Rich, 707 F.2d at 670.
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with a grand jury subpoena duces tecum. 145 Moreover, this author has
found no cases in which a court ruled that an order compelling the pro-
duction of documents is tantamount to preliminary injunctive relief.
Thus, it appears that the district court's application of the prima facie
test was correct, and the court of appeals' application of the reasonable
probability of ultimate success test was incorrect in Marc Rich.
V. THE DISTRICT COURT RESOLVED THE CONFLICTING DEMANDS
IMPOSED UPON MARC RICH & Co. BY UNITED STATES
AND Swiss LAW IN THE UNITED STATES' FAVOR
Finally, the district court addressed the fact that Swiss law forbade
Marc Rich & Co. from producing certain of its documents located in
Switzerland. t4 6 The district court noted that "when compliance with a
grand jury subpoena would violate the law of a foreign nation, the court
must balance the interests of the United States and the foreign na-
tion."147 The district court also stated that even if a defendant might be
criminally punished by a foreign nation if it complied with the subpoena,
courts will nevertheless uphold the subpoena if the interests of the United
States are sufficiently strong.
148
Citing the interests listed in the Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States,14 9 the district court concluded that
the United States' interest in investigating violations of its tax laws out-
weighed the Swiss interest in preventing disclosures of business
secrets.' 50 It noted that the United States government had substantially
shown that Marc Rich & Co. used International to violate United States
tax laws by conveying profit outside the United States to Marc Rich &
Co. and concluded that permitting Marc Rich & Co. to shield this con-
duct from the scrutiny of the grand jury would be a "travesty of jus-
145 See supra note 143.
146 Marc Rich & Co. did not bring up this point on appeal. It is unclear why it did not do so.
147 Marc Rich, No. M-11-188, slip op. at 17.
148 Id. at 18.
149 Marc Rich, No. M-11-188, slip op. at 18. The interests cited by the court were:
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would
impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected to
achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40
(1965)).
150 Marc Rich, No. M-11-188, slip op. at 18.
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tice."1  Moreover, the court found it highly significant that the Swiss
government had not intervened to defend any national interest.
1 52
Therefore, the district court held that the Swiss penal statute did not bar
the disclosure sought by the grand jury.
153
A. Case Law Supports the District Court's Decision to Compel the
Production of Documents Despite Possible Violation of
Swiss Law
The district court could have turned to any one of three positions to
determine whether to order discovery and impose sanctions for noncom-
pliance. The first, and most narrow approach, is embodied in the
Supreme Court decision, Societe Internationale Pour Participations In-
dustrielles Et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers."5 4 In Rogers, the Court bal-
anced three factors in determining whether to order discovery: (1) the
importance of the policy underlying the United States statute involved;
(2) the importance of the documents requested to the party seeking dis-
covery; and (3) the nationality of the party resisting discovery, insofar as
it would affect the party's ability to prevent the foreign government from
imposing sanctions. 5 Rogers examined the propriety of dismissal of the
petitioner's claim in light of the petitioner's good faith efforts to comply
with the court's order to produce the documents requested. Rogers,
however, did not clearly define what would constitute a good faith effort
151 Id. at 18-19.
152 Though prior to the district court's decision, the Swiss government had not intervened, it did
so after the district court decision. Moreover, the Swiss government seized some of the remaining
documents after Marc Rich & Co. began to comply with the order.
Following the district court decision, Marc Rich and Pinkus Green sought an order from a
Swiss court to direct the company to comply fully with the United States' grand jury subpoena. The
Swiss court issued a preliminary injunction requiring Marc Rich & Co. to retain the documents until
the Swiss court issued a final judgment. On June 27, 1983, Marc Rich & Co.'s attorneys appeared
before district court Judge Sand seeking a temporary stay pending a hearing on the motion to vacate
or modify the orders of September 1982. The government's attorneys alleged that Marc Rich & Co.
had, in essence, really brought this suit against itself in the Swiss courts as a "thinly veiled effort on
their part to put themselves in a position so that" the company would not be held in contempt of
court when the company did not produce the requested documents." Transcript, J. Sand's Cham-
bers at 108 (June 27, 1983).
An attorney appeared on behalf of the Swiss government to tell the court that Switzerland
desired to avoid conflicts between Swiss law and United States law and that it would like a short
period to look into the matter during which time sanctions against Marc Rich & Co. would be
withheld. Id. at 131-33. Judge Sand denied Marc Rich & Co.'s motion and the Swiss government's
application. Id. at 143. Judge Sand stated that the Swiss government could still seek a formal
intervention in the proceedings or appeal to the executive branch of the United States government
for relief. Id. at 130.
153 Marc Rich, No. M-11-188, slip op. at 19.
154 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
155 Id at 204-206.
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or whether good faith necessarily entails affirmative action. 156 Under
this approach, a United States court will order discovery if it determines
that United States' interests in obtaining the documents are substantial
but will order sanctions for noncompliance only if the party fails to make
good faith efforts to comply.157
The second approach, the one used by the district court in Marc
Rich, is contained in the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations.
The Restatement lists five factors which must be considered in determin-
ing whether a discovery order should be issued and whether sanctions for
noncompliance should be issued: (1) the vital national interests of each
of the states; (2) the extent and nature of the hardship that inconsistent
enforcement actions would impose on the party; (3) the extent to which
the required conduct will take place in the territory of the other state;
(4) the nationality of the parties; and (5) the extent enforcement by ac-
tion of either state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance
with the rule prescribed by that state. 158 The Restatement, unlike Rogers,
considers the vital national interests of both countries, not only those of
156 Comment, Extraterritorial Discovery: An Analysis Based on Good Faith, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1320, 1330 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Extraterritorial Discovery]. In Rogers, a Swiss company,
through the consent of the Swiss government, released over 190,000 documents and presented a plan
of disclosure approved by the Swiss government to the district court. The plan was designed to
achieve maximum compliance with the production order without violating Swiss secrecy laws. Rog-
ers, 357 U.S. at 203.
157 Extraterritorial Discovery, supra note 155, at 1331. In that Comment, the author proposes a
uniform approach which focuses on a well-defined good faith effort to comply with a discovery order
as the basis for determining when to impose sanctions for noncompliance. A conclusion that the
party has made good faith efforts to comply would be justified by three findings: (1) the absence of
any unjustified reliance on foreign nondisclosure laws, (2) the undertaking of affirmative efforts to
comply with the discovery order, and (3) the absence of any "courting of foreign impediments." Id.
at 1347. Under the good faith standard, if a party does not produce the requested documents but
makes good faith efforts to produce the documents, a court will not impose sanctions. Id. at 1350.
It could be argued, however, that whenever a party places documents in a country with business
secrecy laws, the party is "courting foreign impediments" to the disclosure of such documents. An-
other problem with this standard relates to the quantum of affirmative acts a party must show for a
court to conclude the party has made good faith efforts to comply with the production order. More-
over, only if the party knows that noncompliance will definitely lead to sanctions, as under the
balancing test, will the party attempt to release its documents and obtain a waiver of sanctions from
the country in which the documents are located. Under the good faith test, however, the party and
the other country will view the party's "affirmative acts" as having been taken only to satisfy the
standard. The other country will therefore assert that it refuses to waive sanctions against the party
if it releases the documents requested so that a United States court will refuse to order the produc-
tion of documents under the good faith test. Thus, the good faith test is not workable because under
it, a party's affirmative acts are a tactic to convince a United States court not to compel the produc-
tion of documents rather than a tactic to convince another government to waive sanctions for pro-
ducing the documents.
158 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40
(1965).
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the United States.' 5 9
A third, and broader approach, which the district court did not
adopt, is embodied in United States v. etco.' 6 Vetco combines the Re-
statement's five factors and a good faith analysis in determining the pro-
priety of ordering discovery and sanctions for noncompliance. The court
in Vetco required more than a good faith showing to prevent sanctions
for noncompliance as the court required in the civil case of Rogers, be-
cause "an I.R.S. summons issued pursuant to an investigation of poten-
tial criminal conduct. . . serve[s] a more pressing national function than
civil discovery."''
The district court's balancing of the conflicting claims on Marc Rich
& Co. and its decision to compel the production of documents in poten-
tial violation of Swiss law conforms with legal precedent and sound pol-
icy. The court complied with legal precedent by applying the
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law. Had it applied the
three factor analysis enunciated by the Supreme Court in Rogers, the
court would have also ordered discovery since that standard compels dis-
covery when the United States' interest is as strong as it was in Marc
159 See supra text accompanying note 158.
Another proposed approach focuses on the impact that conflict of law decisions have on the
entire international legal system, as opposed to merely the interest and relations of the two countries
involved. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and
Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L 280 (1982). Under this approach, when determining
which country's law controls, courts have a "duty to consider [the international system's] values of
fairness, predictability, and smooth interaction independently of the state's substantive interests as
reflected in the relevant laws." Id. at 288.
This proposal, however, conflicts with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9
Comment b (1971) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 3 comment j (1965), which state that United States courts cannot give effect to interna-
tional legal requirements if there is clear congressional direction to do otherwise. Id. at 291.
This approach emphasizes that United States law in this area can serve as the basis of interna-
tional precedent and can therefore legitimize similar claims by other nations. The writer cites to two
Supreme Court decisions which limited the applicability of the National Labor Relations Act to
foreign crews on foreign flag vessels due to fear of legitimizing reciprocal claims. Lauritzen v. Lar-
sen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (foreign ship owner sued for injury; court held it had jurisdiction but that
the Jones Act was inapplicable); Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959) (for-
eign ship owner sued for injury; court held it had jurisdiction but that the Jones Act was inapplica-
ble). Maier, supra at 307.
160 United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 671 (1981) The
I.R.S. summoned a Swiss corporation to produce certain documents located in Switzerland. The
court upheld the summons stating that the United States' interest in obtaining the summoned docu-
ments was strong, and that Switzerland has a small interest in preventing the release of the docu-
ments. In addition, the Swiss company failed to show a substantial likelihood that compliance with
the court's order would lead to the successful prosecution of the company by the Swiss. Id. at 1333.
161 Vetco at 1330.
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The district court's and the court of appeals' decisions, by directly
and indirectly validating the transaction of business test as a new federal
standard of criminal jurisdiction,'63 have tremendously improved the
ability of the United States to prosecute multinational corporations for
alleged violations of United States law.' 64 At the same time, however,
these decisions may be used by other nations' courts as precedent sup-
porting the assertion of jurisdiction over United States citizens or mul-
tinational corporations.165 As previously noted, the transaction of
business test may not be the best standard of criminal jurisdiction since it
may discourage international trade in the United States and deny due
process of law to potential defendants.' 66 Nevertheless, the presence/
doing business test should not be adopted in its place because it is also
flawed in that it inadequately protects the United States' interest in pros-
ecuting alleged violations of its laws.' 6 7
At the present time, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has
established a uniform federal standard of criminal jurisdiction. As a re-
sult, lower federal courts have applied various standards of jurisdiction
over foreign defendants.' 68 This application of varying standards may
not only constitute a denial of due process of law,' 69 but it may also
discourage foreign trade with the United States, United States citizens,
and United States-based corporations.
170
This Note recommends, therefore, that either Congress or the
162 See supra text accompanying note 157. Moreover, the factor approach, in this author's opin-
ion, is more workable than the uniform good faith approach.
163 See supra § II A of this Note.
164 See supra § III B of this Note. Unless the defendant has property within the United States
jurisdiction, a United States court lacks the leverage necessary to force a nonresident defendant to
comply with the court's order. Marc Rich & Co. did have property within the United States-the
I.R.S. froze $90 million of Marc Rich & Co.'s U.S. assets, including a substantial interest in Twenti-
eth Century-Fox which the government seized to enforce its $50,000.00 a day sanction for noncom-
pliance with the order for the production of documents. Tully & Worth, supra note 4, at 51.
For a discussion of the imposition of sanctions for failure to comply with a discovery order, see
Comment, Discovery-Power to Impose Sanctions for Failure to Make Discovery on Jurisdictional
Issues, 13 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 109-23 (1982).
Though the trial was set for June 1984, the United States government was unable to extradite
Mr. Rich or Mr. Green from Switzerland where they reside. Id.
165 See supra § III B of this Note.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
169 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
170 See supra § III C of this Note.
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Supreme Court consider establishing a uniform federal standard of crimi-
nal jurisdiction in order to end the current confusion. Of the three stan-
dards of jurisdiction which the lower federal courts have applied, 171 the
detrimental consequences test best meets the United States' various inter-
ests. 172 Therefore, this Note recommends that the detrimental conse-
quences test should form the basis of any uniform federal standard of
criminal jurisdiction.
Debra Pogrund Stark
171 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
172 See supra §§ III B and C of this Note.
